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Abstract 5 
Decision making about transport infrastructure investment is based on the net impacts and risks 6 
to the community. The private sector is often involved in toll road projects, including various 7 
schemes to design, build, operate and/or finance the project either in a partnership with a host 8 
government, independently, or in some combination. Cost-Benefit Analysis of a privately 9 
operated toll road require careful allocations of project impacts, in order to properly reflect the 10 
net impacts and risks to the community from the host government’s perspective. This study 11 
investigates whether alternative assumptions are valid from differing perspectives, when toll 12 
roads are delivered and operated privately rather than by a host government. Treatments of tolls 13 
and other toll road project related payments are considered from different perspectives. Cost-14 
Benefit Analysis is conducted for a synthesised toll tunnel project case by considering 15 
alternating treatments of some impacts. This leads to the exploration of analyses outcomes 16 
when the treatment of tolls differ when two perspectives of “toll as a transfer payment” and 17 
“toll as an end user cost” are considered. Various scenarios are explored including public versus 18 
private operations. The Monte Carlo simulation approach is used to account the risks of 19 
variables in the analysis. The synthesised case study revealed that, for privately operated toll 20 
roads, treating toll charges as a transfer payment, and alternatively as an end user cost, can both 21 
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be valid approaches but from two perspectives. Moreover, the analysis outcomes under 22 
different perspectives are particularly helpful to make decisions on the basis of the impacts and 23 
risks solely from the perspective of the host government. The proposed methodology can 24 
examine various scenarios other than the ones examined in this study and is extremely useful 25 
in the project evaluation of privately operated toll road projects.  26 
KEY WORDS: toll road; cost-benefit analysis; public-private partnership; Monte Carlo 27 
simulation; transport planning; transport economics 28 
Introduction 29 
The private sector is often involved in toll road projects, including various schemes to design, 30 
build, operate and/or finance the project either in a partnership with a host government, 31 
independently, or in some combination. Involvement of the private sector requires careful 32 
allocations of project impacts when conducting Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) in order to 33 
properly reflect the net impacts to the community. The aim of this study is to investigate 34 
whether alternative assumptions are valid from differing perspectives, when toll roads are 35 
delivered and operated privately rather than by a host government. Treatments of tolls and toll 36 
road project related payments are considered from different perspectives. CBA is conducted 37 
for a synthesised toll tunnel project case by considering alternating treatments of some impacts. 38 
This leads to the exploration of CBA outcomes when the treatment of tolls differ when two 39 
perspectives of “toll as a transfer payment” (TTP) and “toll as an end user cost” (TUC) are 40 
considered. A toll tunnel project case was synthesised on the basis of the overarching 41 
characteristics of recent Australian toll tunnel projects. The Monte Carlo simulation approach 42 
is used to allow the risks of various variables to be accounted in the CBA. 43 
There are disagreements and obscurity in the treatment of tolls in CBA. Along with various 44 
concession payments, the treatment of tolls are investigated in this study. Additionally, it is 45 
important to distinguish CBA for public decision making from financial analysis. A number of 46 
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studies have considered perspectives in financial analysis, however studying the considerations 47 
of perspectives in CBA for public decision making is limited. This study widens the knowledge 48 
by conducting CBA for a toll road project, while considering perspectives in the analysis. 49 
This paper first reviews relevant literature and presents the study methodology. It then 50 
develops models for CBA calculations. Finally, CBA results, discussions and conclusions are 51 
drawn. 52 
Literature Review 53 
Governments are responsible for public decision-making for the good of their constituents. 54 
This includes ensuring that public funds are invested wisely and that regulation of private sector 55 
activity ensures a net benefit to society. Public decision-making about infrastructure investment 56 
is based on the net impacts measured by the host government through project evaluation. 57 
Project evaluation is a quantitative process conducted for significant projects to evaluate net 58 
impacts to the community and to ensure that public decisions are made in kind. 59 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is the most commonly used project evaluation methodology 60 
for major road projects (Wee & Rietveld, 2014) and is well-established in literature (Boardman, 61 
Greenberg, Vining, & Weimer, 2014; De Rus, 2010). CBA measures the net impacts of a 62 
project by monetising and allocating the impacts to benefits and costs (Rogers & Duffy, 2012; 63 
Wee & Rietveld, 2014). Broad perspectives including road users and non-road users can be 64 
included in CBA (Decorla-Souza, Lee, Timothy, & Mayer, 2013). The outcome of CBA is 65 
generally presented using Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR), which is a representation of a ratio of the 66 
monetised benefits to monetised costs. Additionally, the scope of the CBA is limited to 67 
economic impacts to the community. The analysis becomes extremely difficult when the scope 68 
includes the economic impacts to the whole of state or a country (Australian Transport and 69 
Infrastructure Council, 2016b). Currently, the Australian guideline to include wider economic 70 
benefits in CBA is in development and Australian Transport and Infrastructure Council advises 71 
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to exclude the wider economic impacts from CBA (Australian Transport and Infrastructure 72 
Council, 2016a). Taxes including income tax revenues from the labor markets and income tax 73 
of a privately toll operator are considered as part of the wider economic benefits and it is 74 
beyond the scope of this study to include those impacts. 75 
The fundamental difference between public CBA and financial analysis is that the former 76 
focuses on impacts to the community. For instance, monetised travel time impacts and travel 77 
distance impacts, which are not captured in financial analysis, are considered in the public CBA 78 
of a major road project. It is beyond the scope of this study to address financial impacts and 79 
risks of a project as this study solely focuses on the impacts and risks to the community using 80 
CBA. Consideration of perspectives has been given to investigate financial viability of a project 81 
in a number of studies (Mishra, Khasnabis, & Swain, 2013; Pantelias & Zhang, 2010), however 82 
they have not been studied for public CBA. Zhang, Bai, Labi and Sinha (2013) found in their 83 
financial analysis that the host government is unlikely to gain sufficient benefits from toll road 84 
projects unless traffic growth and toll prices are sufficient to provide financial benefit that is 85 
equivalent to an upfront capital cost contribution. This study extends this knowledge by 86 
widening the scope of the evaluation to the benefits with regard to impacts to the community 87 
using public CBA. By using public CBA, various benefits to the community including a 88 
number of transport benefits such as travel time saving can be considered in the evaluation. 89 
The private sector can often be involved in a toll road project to design, build, operate, 90 
finance and transfer the project. These Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangements are 91 
commonly referred to in the literature as design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) or build-92 
operate-transfer (BOT) schemes. Involvements of the private sectors raise questions of whether 93 
tolls should be considered as a financial transfer. Particularly compelling is when the private 94 
operator collects tolls. Toll revenues are generally only included in public CBA by affecting 95 
travel behaviours and efficiencies in the transport system (Decorla-Souza et al., 2013). In 96 
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Boardman, Vining and Waters’s study (1993), toll revenues have been included as benefits to 97 
the community in CBA. The guidance on the treatment of tolls in CBA in extant guidelines 98 
(Australian Transport and Infrastructure Council, 2016b; Queensland Department of Transport 99 
and Main Roads, 2011; Rockliffe, Patrick, & Tsolakis, 2012) is limited. For instance, 100 
Queensland CBA manual (Queensland Department of Transport and Main Roads, 2011) 101 
advises to only include tolls as one of the factors that influence road demands. These indicate 102 
that there are disagreements and obscurity in the treatment of tolls in public CBA. 103 
A number of authors have investigated the traffic forecasting of toll roads and its accuracy. 104 
Traffic forecasts play key roles in many studies of toll road projects, because the traffic volume 105 
drives the outcomes of both economic and financial assessments. Many studies (Australian 106 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport, 2011; Bain, 2009; J M Vassallo & Baeza, 2007) 107 
have reported overestimations in toll road traffic forecasts. Rose and Hensher (2014) claim that 108 
misestimating value of travel time is the main contributor of errors in traffic forecasting of toll 109 
roads. 110 
Toll pricing strategies are well discussed in the literature. A number of strategies exist in 111 
toll pricing, such as maximising travel time reliability (Tirachini, Hensher, & Bliemer, 2014), 112 
and maximising toll revenue (Joksimovic, Bliemer, & Bovy, 2005). Beck and Hensher (2015) 113 
highlighted that a well-designed toll pricing scheme can provide demonstrable time savings in 114 
the peak time. Hensher and Bliemer (2014) suggested that to ensure sufficient toll revenues to 115 
the host government, registration charges need to be reduced and the distance-based peak time 116 
pricing need to be implemented . 117 
Traffic forecasting of toll roads, toll pricing and estimations of value of time largely 118 
influence the performance and the level of service of a toll road. However, this study solely 119 
focuses on the two perspectives of “toll as a transfer payment” (TTP) and “toll as an end user 120 
cost” (TUC) and alternative treatments of tolls and other payments specific to toll road projects 121 
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in CBA. Traffic modelling that incorporates tolls, and estimations of project costs, effective 122 
toll prices, value of time and the appropriate discount rate are beyond the scope of this study. 123 
Table 2 summarises recent literature of public evaluations of toll road projects. Toll road 124 
projects have been evaluated in numerous articles, however many focus on traffic and revenue 125 
forecasting (Bain, 2009; Li & Hensher, 2010; Welde, 2011), while there is limited study in the 126 
literature regarding public CBA for toll road projects.  127 
TABLE 1 Evaluation of toll road projects found in academic literature 128 
[Insert Table 1 here]  129 
Methodology 130 
Examining differing perspectives and model development 131 
Relevant literature including the role of governments in project evaluation and Cost-Benefit 132 
Analysis (CBA) are reviewed. Two perspectives of “toll as a transfer payment” (TTP) and “toll 133 
as an end user cost” (TUC) are drawn from the findings of literature review. On the basis of 134 
these perspectives, the treatments of tolls and other payments that are often used in toll road 135 
projects are examined. These payments are examined by observing their flows between various 136 
entities such as road users, non-road users, the host government and the private operator. 137 
Models of each payment are then developed to reflect these flows. The synthesised case is 138 
evaluated using the stochastic CBA and the developed models. Examining the risk profiles of 139 
different payment scenarios reveal how shifts of risks can be portrayed in the stochastic CBA. 140 
This also determines the treatments of project impacts that best reflect the risk characteristics 141 
of a toll road project across scenarios. 142 
Figure 1 presents the methodology of the evaluation of the synthesised toll tunnel project 143 
case. It consists of three phases, which are explained in the following section.  144 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 145 
FIGURE 1 Methodology of the stochastic CBA of the synthesised toll tunnel project case 146 
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1) Identifying Concession Payments and Costs 147 
The concession payments and costs that are involved in a toll road project need to be first 148 
identified. The flows of these payments and costs can then be examined to identify the entity 149 
that is responsible for each payment and cost. Costs that the host government and its 150 
constituents are responsible for can be determined on the basis of the payment flows. The costs 151 
that can be considered as financial transfers would be excluded in this process. Total costs in 152 
stochastic forms can be developed using Monte Carlo simulation. Meanwhile, models can be 153 
developed for each payment and cost. 154 
2) Estimation of benefits 155 
Input variables of benefits considered in public CBA such as vehicle hours travelled saving 156 
(VHTS) need to be determined based on the characteristics of the toll road. Each benefit in a 157 
stochastic form can then be developed on the basis of probability distribution forms of input 158 
variables using Monte Carlo simulation. The benefits that are generally considered in public 159 
CBA of a major road project include travel time saving, vehicle operating cost saving, crash 160 
cost saving, environmental and external cost saving, and residual value. 161 
3) Evaluation and decision-making 162 
The stochastic Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) distribution can be developed based on the stochastic 163 
costs and benefits. The outcome BCR distributions represent the net impacts and risks of the 164 
project. Moreover, risk profiles can be developed for the toll road project on the basis of the 165 
stochasticity of the outcome BCR distributions. 166 
Monte Carlo Simulation 167 
For the purpose of public CBA, this study presumes that each input variable was undertaken 168 
before the end of construction of the toll road. Therefore, risks exist in the variables that are 169 
determined from traffic modelling and estimations of project related costs. These variables 170 
include annual average daily traffic (AADT), traffic growth, vehicle hours travelled saving 171 
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(VHTS), vehicle kilometres travelled saving (VKTS), proportion of heavy vehicles (HV%), 172 
capital cost, and O&M cost. The risks of these variables are accounted in CBA using the Monte 173 
Carlo approach in this study. For each variable, the form of probability distribution, mean, and 174 
coefficient of variation (CV) are defined based on the project characteristics of the synthesised 175 
case and inference from a range of literature. Deterministic values of planning horizon and 176 
discount rate are incorporated in this study. This study presumes that operation and 177 
maintenance (O&M) cost to be ten percent of the whole capital cost, hence O&M cost is 178 
stochastic when capital cost is stochastic. 179 
Monte Carlo simulation is a well-established risk analysis tool. Mun (2010) explains the 180 
fundamental underpinning of the Monte Carlo simulation methodology in great detail. Monte 181 
Carlo simulation has been incorporated in a number of literature studying financial analysis 182 
and decision making of public investment (De Rus, 2010; Glasserman, 2003; Lemp & 183 
Kockelman, 2009; Mishra, Khasnabis, & Dhingra, 2013; Mishra, Khasnabis, & Swain, 2015). 184 
Lemp and Kockleman (2009) argue that Monte Carlo simulation is an effective tool to 185 
understand the risk of a project, however also claim that Monte Carlo simulation require more 186 
computing time than sensitivity analysis. 187 
Monte Carlo simulation can be used to produce a stochastic Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) set 188 
on the basis of a sufficiently large number of trials, and hence a comprehensive risk profile of 189 
the project on the basis of various combinations of input impacts. In this study, with each trial, 190 
the value of each variable was simulated by a Monte Carlo draw from its predefined probability 191 
distribution with predefined mean and CV. When 100,000 trials are conducted, a set of 100,000 192 
BCR values will be obtained to ensure a sufficiently representative variation in output. This set 193 
represents the outcome stochastic BCR distribution for the project of interest. 194 
Risk Profiling of the Synthesised Project 195 
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The BCR distribution that was generated using CBA and Monte Carlo simulation can be 196 
analysed using various statistical inferences. The interpretations of various measurements 197 
provide a comprehensive representation of the risk of a project. Table 2 shows the statistical 198 
inferences that were used in this study, which are particularly useful for comparisons of 199 
different scenarios or methodologies. For instance, CV of the outcome BCR distribution can 200 
be compared with the predefined CVs of input variables to assess how the risk of each input 201 
variable impacts the risk of the outcome BCR.  202 
TABLE 2 Measures of risk profiles and their interpretations 203 
[Insert Table 2 here] 204 
Studying the Synthesised Toll Tunnel Project Case 205 
This study considers a toll tunnel project instead of a toll road project due to the considerable 206 
scale of its construction cost. Economic justification of a tunnel project is therefore particularly 207 
crucial in project evaluation. A toll tunnel project case is synthesised to demonstrate a 208 
stochastic approach to project evaluation on the basis of overarching characteristics of existing 209 
toll road projects. The purpose behind studying the synthesised case is so that its project 210 
characteristics could be adjusted in a controlled manner to examine various risk scenarios. 211 
Examining Perspectives 212 
Research Hypothesis  213 
Traditionally, when public CBA is used to evaluate toll projects, tolls have been assumed to 214 
be, and therefore treated as financial transfers and not counted as societal costs; instead the 215 
capital cost and O&M cost are those which are treated as the societal cost impacts. As Decorla-216 
Souza (2013) claimed, toll revenues are generally only included in public CBA by affecting 217 
travel behaviours and efficiencies in the transport system. This is rational when the host 218 
government obtains the toll revenues, because the end users who pay those tolls are constituents 219 
of the host government and therefore enjoy the benefit of that toll revenue through government 220 
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expenditure, including repayment of project debt. However, depending on the perspective 221 
taken within decision-making, the influences of each impact need to be considered carefully in 222 
public CBA, especially when the private sector is involved in the project. This is particularly 223 
so for cost impacts that are borne by the private sector.  224 
If one takes the perspective that the private operator is an element of an overall economy 225 
that bears the costs and reaps the benefits of a project, then the assumption of the toll as a 226 
transfer payment is appropriate. However, for public sector decision-making, an alternative 227 
perspective can be that the host government, as the decision-maker on behalf of the community, 228 
should consider how the end users bear the cost and reap the benefits of a project. Under such 229 
an assumption, cost impacts are considered to be recouped in a commercial environment by a 230 
private operator charging tolls to the end users, who in the case of a toll road are normally the 231 
host government’s constituents. Therefore, from this perspective, those end user toll charges 232 
should be counted as the societal cost impacts in public CBA. Furthermore, it is reasonable to 233 
contend that any capital and/or O&M costs that are borne by the private operator should be 234 
excluded from the public CBA, because they are financial impositions that are contained within 235 
the private operator’s enterprise of offering services to consumers, rather than as an end user 236 
societal cost. The effect of this perspective is that the private operator is sequestered from the 237 
overall economy, such that the host government can evaluate the project independent of the 238 
private operator’s financial interests. Notwithstanding, these considerations become more 239 
entangled when a toll road project is delivered in some form of Public-Private Partnership 240 
(PPP).  241 
The principal rationale of the “toll as an end user cost” (TUC) perspective is that it may 242 
enable the public decision-maker to understand how the risk profile to the end user community 243 
as expressed by the public CBA might differ from that of the risk profile among the overall 244 
economy, including the toll operator, under the “toll as a transfer payment” (TTP) perspective. 245 
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The remainder of this chapter uses a case study approach to examine the extent to which public 246 
CBA results vary between these two perspectives.  247 
Consideration of Cost Formats of Toll Road Projects 248 
Commonly for a toll road project, concession deeds may include various risk sharing 249 
arrangements. For instance, a minimum revenue guarantee arrangement enables the private 250 
operator to mitigate its traffic uncertainty risk with its financial obligations, through a 251 
mechanism where the host government effectively acts as a guarantor should revenue fall short 252 
of the private operator’s required debt repayment during a period. Alternatively, the host 253 
government may permit the private operator to charge a higher toll price in order to balance its 254 
traffic uncertainty risk with its financial obligation of debt repayment. Additionally, an upfront 255 
capital cost contribution may be paid by the host government to support the start-up of the 256 
project; the amount depending upon its budgetary and political priorities. These arrangements 257 
are forms of risk management strategy and need to be considered carefully in project 258 
evaluation. Therefore, the public CBA for toll road projects needs to appropriately account for 259 
these impacts and their risks.  260 
Figure 2 summarises the payment flow when a toll road project is fully delivered by the 261 
host government. The thick line shows the payment that is considered in this study under this 262 
scenario. When the host government is designing, building, financing and operating the toll 263 
road, including through traditional methods of purchasing from the private sector, they are 264 
responsible for capital cost and O&M cost, while the road users, who are its constituents, are 265 
paying for tolls. In this scenario, the tolls and any imposed consumption taxation can be 266 
considered as a financial transfer between the public toll operator and the users. Moreover, a 267 
part of the tolls paid by commercial vehicles can be considered as financial transfers as they 268 
are paid back by the end users. However, these are considered as part of the wider economic 269 
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impacts and not considered in this study, as with other wider economic impacts that are 270 
generally excluded from the public CBA of major road projects. 271 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 272 
FIGURE 2 Payment flow of when toll roads are delivered and operated by the host government 273 
from the “toll as a transfer payment” (TTP) perspective 274 
Figure 3 summarises the payment flow when a toll road is fully designed, built, financed 275 
and operated by a private sector entity or entities. The thick lines show the payments that are 276 
considered in this study under this scenario. For purposes of this study, the private sector 277 
entities are collectively termed as the private operator. The host government may be 278 
responsible for an upfront capital cost contribution and minimum revenue guarantee if included 279 
in the concession deed. The private operator is responsible for the balance of capital cost and 280 
O&M cost, while collecting tolls and receiving any minimum revenue guarantee payments 281 
from the host government. In this scenario, tolls are hypothesised to no longer be a financial 282 
transfer under the TUC perspective, because the sum of upfront capital cost contribution and 283 
the guarantee would not be equivalent to the capital and O&M costs. Hence, costs to the 284 
community that need to be accounted in public CBA in this scenario are the upfront capital 285 
cost contribution, any minimum revenue guarantees, and the tolls paid as end users net of any 286 
imposed consumption taxation. 287 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 288 
FIGURE 3 Payment flow of when toll roads are delivered and operated privately from the “toll 289 
as an end user cost” (TUC) perspective 290 
As introduced in the discussion above, another scenario that could apply to a toll road is 291 
that when the private operator charges a premium toll price instead of receiving a minimum 292 
revenue guarantee from the host government. In this scenario, the premium tolls paid by the 293 
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users replaces the minimum revenue guarantee in public CBA. This is summarised in Figure 294 
4. The thick lines show the payments that are considered in this study under this scenario. 295 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 296 
FIGURE 4 Payment flow of when the private operator charges premium tolls from the TUC 297 
perspective 298 
Moreover, a number of other risk sharing arrangements can be found with toll road projects, 299 
which for brevity are not dealt with in this study. The impacts of the arrangements need to be 300 
considered carefully for each project to determine whether they need to be counted as costs to 301 
the community in public CBA. 302 
Perspectives Considered for this Study 303 
As has been previously discussed, a toll road project can be delivered under various schemes. 304 
Two perspectives are examined in this study that consider all of the scenarios that were 305 
previously discussed and highlight the difference in terms of payment flows between the host 306 
government and the private operator. The first is the TTP perspective whereby the toll road 307 
project is fully delivered and operated by the host government at a baseline toll price, therefore 308 
the total cost to the community is the sum of capital cost and O&M cost. Then, three scenarios 309 
of the TUC perspective are considered. The first scenario is a “baseline toll with no guarantee” 310 
(BNG), whereby the private operator receives no minimum revenue guarantees and charges 311 
users the baseline toll price, which is further detailed in later section. The second scenario is a 312 
“baseline toll with minimum revenue guarantee” (BRG), whereby the private operator charges 313 
users the baseline toll price, however receives a minimum revenue guarantee from the host 314 
government where necessary in a given period. The third scenario is a “premium toll with no 315 
guarantee” (PNG), whereby the private operator charges a higher toll price than baseline, 316 
instead of receiving the minimum revenue guarantee. Table 3 summarises the costs considered 317 
in CBA across the perspectives and scenarios. 318 
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TABLE 3 Costs to the community that are considered in CBA for this study 319 
[Insert Table 3 here]  320 
Model Development 321 
Traffic Volume and Growth 322 
For purposes of clarity of the synthesised case study, traffic volume is calculated yearly based 323 
on the initial annual average daily traffic (AADT) and traffic growth rate. The traffic growth 324 
rate is presumed to be constant over the whole planning horizon. The AADT at year 𝑦 for 325 
Monte Carlo trial 𝑗 is given as follows: 326 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇𝑦,𝑗 = 𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇𝑖,𝑗×(1 + 𝑔𝑗)
(𝑦−1)
 (1) 
Where: 327 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇𝑖,𝑗 = initial average annual daily traffic for Monte Carlo trial 𝑗 (veh) 328 
𝑔𝑗 = traffic growth rate for Monte Carlo trial 𝑗 (%) 329 
𝑦 = corresponding year, 𝑦(0, 1, … , 𝑛) 330 
It is noted that this synthesised case study does not expressly consider a ramp-up period, 331 
which often occurs post opening of a toll road. During the ramp-up period, the traffic growth 332 
rate can be different from, and typically less than, the annual growth rate as the road matures 333 
as a component of the greater road network. However, a ramp-up period may also be readily 334 
incorporated in future research. 335 
Baseline Toll Price 336 
The baseline toll price is determined on the basis of the expected traffic volume, while the 337 
project cost contains risks as the baseline toll price is determined before the completion of the 338 
construction. This study presumes that this baseline toll price would be incorporated into traffic 339 
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modelling to estimate AADT, traffic growth, VHTS, VKTS and HV%, therefore the risks of 340 
these variables are not accounted in the baseline toll price model.  341 
The baseline toll price is that which equates the sum of the net capital cost after upfront 342 
capital cost contribution is deducted and the operating and maintenance (O&M) cost, to the 343 
expected value of all collected tolls when brought to net present value. It is important to note 344 
that this is not a financial analysis and does not ensure that the private operator will recover its 345 
cost and yield a profit during the planning horizon. Rather, it is that particular toll price which, 346 
under the expected opening year AADT and the expected traffic growth rate, would yield the 347 
same project cost to the community as a public road with the same total capital plus O&M cost. 348 
That is, under the “toll as an end user cost” (TUC) perspective, the present value of its expected 349 
cost would the same as that under the “toll as a transfer payment” (TTP) perspective. It is a 350 
starting point for consideration of various payments considered in the scenarios, which are 351 
detailed later. The baseline toll price is calculated as follows: 352 
∑[𝑇𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒,𝑗×𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇𝑦,𝑒𝑥𝑝×365×(1 + 𝑑)
(1−𝑦)] 
𝑛
𝑦=1
= (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗 + 𝑂&𝑀𝑗 − 𝑈𝑃) 
(2) 
𝑇𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒,𝑗  =
(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗 + 𝑂&𝑀𝑗 − 𝑈𝑃)
∑ [𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇𝑦,𝑒𝑥𝑝×365×(1 + 𝑑)
(1−𝑦)] 𝑛𝑦=1
 
(3) 
𝑇𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒  =
∑ (𝑇𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒,𝑗) 
𝑙
𝑗=1
𝑙
 
(4) 
Where: 353 
𝑛 = number of years in planning horizon 354 
𝑇𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒,𝑗 = baseline toll price for Monte Carlo trial 𝑗 ($) 355 
𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇𝑦,𝑒𝑥𝑝 = expected AADT with expected traffic growth at year 𝑦 (veh) 356 
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𝑑 = discount rate applicable to the project format (%) 357 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗 = total capital cost in present value for Monte Carlo trial 𝑗 ($) 358 
𝑂&𝑀𝑗= total O&M cost over the whole planning horizon for Monte Carlo trial 𝑗 as a present 359 
year cost ($) 360 
𝑈𝑃 = upfront payment to capital cost ($) 361 
𝑙 = number of Monte Carlo trials 362 
When the host government contributes a set upfront capital cost contribution towards the 363 
gross capital cost, the risk of capital cost is borne by the private operator through the net capital 364 
cost that it contributes after the upfront capital cost contribution is deducted. This study 365 
presumes the upfront capital cost contribution to be deterministic. Notwithstanding, the public 366 
CBA presented here could be modified to allow for a variable upfront capital cost contribution 367 
to be made by the host government. 368 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee 369 
For purposes of this synthesised case study, the minimum revenue guarantee is defined as a 370 
payment paid by the host government to the private operator in any year of the planning 371 
horizon, when the toll revenue of that year is less than the payment which is required of the 372 
private operator to meet its obligations to its financier, which for illustrative purposes of this 373 
study are limited to its principal plus interest repayments. The following annual finance 374 
repayment by the private operator for Monte Carlo trial 𝑗 is assumed: 375 
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙,𝑗 =
𝑟(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗 + 𝑂&𝑀𝑗 − 𝑈𝑃)
1 − (1 + 𝑟)−𝑛
 
(5) 
Where: 376 
𝑟 = financier’s interest rate on the private entity’s loan (%) 377 
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Under the minimum revenue guarantee scenario, any necessary amount of guarantee payment 378 
is calculated uniquely for each period (year) of a Monte Carlo trial of traffic volume to 379 
incorporate the risk of the guarantee payment and the traffic uncertainty risk in its CBA. This 380 
allows the development of a stochastic distribution of the guarantee payment. The guarantee 381 
payment at year 𝑦 for Monte Carlo trial 𝑗 is given as follows: 382 
𝐺𝑦,𝑗 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {
(𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇𝑦,𝑗×365×𝑇𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒) −
𝑃𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙,𝑗
(1 + 𝑖)(𝑦−1)
0
 
(6) 
Where: 383 
𝑖 = annual rate of inflation in the economy (%) 384 
Under the minimum revenue guarantee scenario, the baseline toll price is not necessarily 385 
that which the private operator would wish to charge, or which the host government would 386 
want it to charge. Rather, it is an optimal toll price under the assumptions of this study for the 387 
purposes of CBA. Sensitivity analysis could readily be performed on the impact of different 388 
baseline toll prices on the stochastic Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) distribution. 389 
Premium Toll 390 
The premium toll price is defined in this study as that which the host government permits the 391 
private operator to charge, such that it is expected to earn sufficient revenue that a minimum 392 
revenue guarantee by the host government is not warranted during any year of the planning 393 
horizon, irrespective of traffic uncertainty risk. In this scenario, stochastically simulated traffic 394 
volumes of each Monte Carlo trial that were produced under the minimum revenue guarantee 395 
scenario are unknown, as evaluation of these two scenarios are conducted independently. 396 
Although, the expected guarantee payment amount is known, because this can easily be 397 
estimated before the completion of construction of the road. A number of approaches exist to 398 
estimate the expected guarantee payment. For purposes of this study, the expected of the 399 
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stochastic guarantee payment distribution that was developed under the minimum revenue 400 
guarantee scenario was implemented as the expected guarantee payment. The price of premium 401 
toll is therefore determined on the basis of the expected guarantee payment amount, while 402 
incorporating the traffic uncertainty risk. 403 
It is first necessary to calculate the premium toll coefficient. This is the ratio of the cost that 404 
is borne by both the host government and the private operator, to that which is borne by the 405 
private operator alone, under the minimum revenue guarantee scenario. The premium toll 406 
coefficient for Monte Carlo trial 𝑗 is given as follows: 407 
𝑅𝑗 =
𝑇𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 ∑ [𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇𝑦,𝑗×365×(1 + 𝑑)
(1−𝑦)]𝑛𝑦=1 + ∑ [𝐺𝑦,𝑒𝑥𝑝×(1 + 𝑑)
(1−𝑦)]𝑛𝑦=1
𝑇𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 ∑ [𝐴𝐴𝐷𝑇𝑦,𝑗×365×(1 + 𝑑)
(1−𝑦)]𝑛𝑦=1
 
(7) 
Where: 408 
𝐺𝑦,𝑒𝑥𝑝 = expected guarantee payment at year 𝑦 in present value ($) 409 
Using this premium toll coefficient, the premium toll price for Monte Carlo trial 𝑗 that would 410 
compensate for the absence of minimum revenue guarantee, is therefore given as follows: 411 
𝑇𝑃𝑝,𝑗 = 𝑇𝑃𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒×𝑅𝑗 (8) 
Literature (Poole, 2011) has identified that toll price may influence traffic volume and 412 
growth, as some users may avoid the toll road as toll price increases. For clarity, this study does 413 
not address this micro-economic behaviour, however elasticity between toll price and traffic 414 
volume may also be considered in future research.  415 
Further, the premium toll is not necessarily that which the private operator would wish to 416 
charge, or which the host government would regulate as a cap. Rather, it is an optimal toll price 417 
that raises an equal revenue to when the baseline toll is collected and the minimum revenue 418 
guarantee is paid, under the assumptions of this study, for the purposes of public CBA. 419 
Sensitivity analysis could also readily be performed on the impact of different toll prices on 420 
the stochastic BCR distribution. 421 
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Synthesising a Toll Tunnel Project Case 422 
The overarching characteristics of recently built toll tunnel projects in Australia were 423 
incorporated to synthesise a toll tunnel project case for the purpose of demonstrating the 424 
analysis of risks within public CBA. The project parameters that are needed to conduct CBA 425 
for this type of major road project include; capital cost, AAD), traffic growth, HV%, VKTS, 426 
VHTS, various transport costs, O&M cost, planning horizon and discount rate. Table 4 presents 427 
these values for the Australian recent urban toll tunnel facilities of Legacy Way, Clem Jones 428 
Tunnel and Airport Link. The amount of capital cost depends on the size and the type of the 429 
infrastructure. For instance, the construction cost of a tunnel project is usually relatively high. 430 
The capital cost of Airport Link was significantly high, given the fact that its construction was 431 
combined with two other projects, the Northern Busway and the Airport Roundabout Upgrade 432 
(BrisConnections, 2011).  433 
TABLE 4 Characteristics of Australian toll tunnels  434 
[Insert Table 4 here] 435 
Table 5 summarises the assumptions that were made in order to conduct public CBA of the 436 
synthesised case. According to Australian Bureau of Infrastructure Transport and Regional 437 
Economics (2012), traffic in Queensland, Australia was estimated to grow by 2.8 percent 438 
annually until 2020. In Queensland, Australia, the discount rate that was used to evaluate major 439 
road projects varies between 6.0 and 7.6 percent (Connell Wagner, 2004; GHD, 2013; 440 
Queensland Government, 2008; SKM & Connell Wagner, 2006, 2008). Therefore, the discount 441 
rate of 7.0 percent was used in this study. All prices were converted to 2015 Australian dollar 442 
values using the Reserve Bank of Australia’s method (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2017). 443 
TABLE 5 Assumptions made in public CBA calculation of the synthesised toll tunnel project 444 
case 445 
[Insert Table 5 here] 446 
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Probability Distributions Used in this Study 447 
The Monte Carlo simulation requires a careful selection of the form of probability distribution 448 
chosen for each impact, along with nuanced postulation of the distribution parameters. The 449 
distribution for an input variable must be selected with sound reasoning. Investigating the 450 
impacts of applying alternative forms of probability distribution by variable is beyond the scope 451 
of this study. Salling (2008) further discusses the use of various probability distributions. CV 452 
needs to be carefully defined as it is a measure of the level of risk in the variable. The magnitude 453 
of risks of various variables have been reviewed previously (Salling & Leleur, 2011) so are not 454 
readdressed here. It is important to note that CV does not indicate the variety of the variable. 455 
For instance, the CV of VHTS does not reflect how VHTS may vary between peak-time and 456 
off-peak time. The mean needs to be carefully defined as it indicates the expected value. The 457 
characteristics, including the form of probability distribution, its mean and CV, predefine the 458 
risk profile of each variable. Therefore, the risk profiles of input variables are inherent within 459 
the risk profile of the outcome Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) distribution. 460 
Capital Cost of a Toll Road Project 461 
It is reasonable that a threshold capital cost exists, below which a project’s development would 462 
not be possible, but that higher cost is plausible due to risks. For this purpose the Cowan’s M3 463 
distribution (Cowan, 1975) was applied. This dichotomised distribution contains a set 464 
proportion of values equal to the minimum, and the remaining proportion distributed negative-465 
exponentially. It has been incorporated  previously in various transport applications (Bunker & 466 
Troutbeck, 2003; Troutbeck, 1992). Capital cost can be modelled using the Cowan’s M3 467 
distribution in cumulative form by: 468 
 469 
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𝐹(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗) =
{
 
 1 − 𝜙𝑒
− 
𝜙(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗−𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)
(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑣−𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛)        𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗 > 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛
1 − 𝜙                                     𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛
0                                              𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗 < 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
(9)  
 470 
Where: 471 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑗 = capital cost in present value for trial 𝑗 ($) 472 
𝜙 = probability that capital cost exceeds 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 (%) 473 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 = minimum feasible capital cost ($) 474 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑣 = expected capital cost ($) 475 
Case Dependent Input Variables 476 
There is a scarcity with regard to identifying the forms of probability distributions of various 477 
traffic modelling outputs. In the Salling and Leleur’s methodology (2011), a probability 478 
distribution was applied to travel time saving as a whole and each risk of input variables needed 479 
to determine the travel time saving was not modelled in their study. For the purpose of this 480 
study, the normal distribution and the CV of 10 percent were applied to those input variables, 481 
because the normal distribution can be used to describe uncertain variables (Mun, 2010). Table 482 
6 summarises the characteristics of the probability distributions used for AADT, yearly traffic 483 
growth rate, HV%, VKTS and VHTS in this study. 484 
Table 6 Probability distribution forms and CV of the case depend input variables 485 
[Insert Table 6 here] 486 
Results 487 
Evaluation of and Decision-Making for the Synthesised Tunnel Project 488 
Table 7 summarises the calculation of deterministic impacts of the synthesised case when all 489 
variables were equal to the expected values of their stochastic distributions. The impact that 490 
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most contributed to the overall benefit was the travel time saving, which are impacted by the 491 
risks of AADT, traffic growth, travel time unit price and VHTS. 492 
TABLE 7 Impacts of the synthesised toll tunnel case when all variables were deterministically 493 
equal to their expected values in present value 494 
[Insert Table 7 here] 495 
Table 8 summarises the risk profiles of the synthesised case. The perspectives of “toll as a 496 
transfer payment” (TTP) and “toll as an end user cost” (TUC), and the scenarios of  “baseline 497 
toll with no guarantee” (BNG), “baseline toll with minimum revenue guarantee” (BRG) and 498 
“premium toll with no guarantee” (PNG) were considered. All perspectives and scenarios 499 
showed similar results of the expected BCR between 1.06 and 1.03. This similarity can be 500 
explained by the assumptions used in the model development in this study. The outcome BCR 501 
may differ when different assumptions are applied. The expected and medians of BCR across 502 
perspectives and scenarios showed great similarities, which indicate that sufficient Monte 503 
Carlo trials were conducted for each scenario. The TTP perspective showed the highest CV 504 
and the scenario BNG showed the highest probability of BCR being greater than 1.0. 505 
TABLE 8 Risk profiles of the synthesised toll tunnel project case across perspectives and 506 
scenarios 507 
[Insert Table 8 here] 508 
Figure 5 shows the cumulative stochastic BCR distributions of the synthesised case. The 509 
cumulative graph clearly illustrates the wider spread in the BCR distribution under the TTP 510 
perspective. 511 
[Insert Figure 5 here] 512 
FIGURE 5 Cumulative stochastic BCR distributions of the synthesised toll tunnel project case 513 
 514 
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Figure 6 shows box and whisker plots of the stochastic BCR distributions of the synthesised 515 
case. The 9th and 91st percentiles were used as the minimum and the maximum of the whiskers 516 
to effectively highlight the characteristics of each distributions. 517 
[Insert Figure 6 here] 518 
FIGURE 6 Box and whisker plots of stochastic BCR distributions of the synthesised toll tunnel 519 
project case 520 
 521 
Examination of Perspectives 522 
Comparison of the perspectives of TTP and TUC under the scenario BNG reveals nearly 523 
identical expected values of BCR. However, from the perspective of the TUC, the CV is 524 
noticeably lower. This is also evident in Figure 5 and Figure 6. This indicates that by 525 
sequestering the toll operator from the overall economy, there is less volatility in BCR, and 526 
therefore less risk borne by the remainder of the community. It follows that the risk represented 527 
by the difference in CV is borne by the toll operator. 528 
Comparison of the perspectives of TTP and TUC under the scenario BRG reveals a slightly 529 
lower expected value of BCR. This is because of the additional payments made by the host 530 
government to guarantee the minimum revenue. Again, from the perspective of the TUC, the 531 
CV is noticeably lower. This is also evident in Figure 5 and Figure 6. This indicates that by 532 
sequestering the toll operator from the overall economy, there is less volatility in BCR, and 533 
therefore less risk borne by the remainder of the community. While it follows that the risk 534 
represented by the difference in CV is borne by the toll operator, the minimum revenue 535 
guarantee payments to some extent mitigate the toll operator’s risk. On the other hand, the 536 
reduction in the expected BCR indicates that the project is less attractive to the remainder of 537 
the community than if there were no minimum revenue guarantee. 538 
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Comparison of the perspectives of TTP and TUC under the scenario PNG also reveals a 539 
slightly lower expected value of BCR. This is also because of the higher tolls paid by the end 540 
users. Again, from the perspective of the TUC, the CV is noticeably lower. This is also evident 541 
in Figure 5 and Figure 6. This indicates that by sequestering the toll operator from the overall 542 
economy, there is less volatility in BCR, and therefore less risk borne by the remainder of the 543 
community. While it follows that the risk represented by the difference in CV is borne by the 544 
toll operator, the premium toll to some extent mitigate the toll operator’s risk. On the other 545 
hand, the reduction in the expected BCR indicates that the project is less attractive to the 546 
remainder of the community than if there were no premium toll. 547 
Discussion 548 
The results suggested that treating tolls as an end user cost in public CBA of a privately 549 
operated toll road project is a reasonable and valid approach under the TUC perspective. 550 
Notwithstanding, the treatment of other payments of the toll road project need to be considered 551 
carefully.  552 
As previously discussed, the risk profile developed in this study does not represent financial 553 
viability and financial risks of the project. It is important to distinguish public CBA and 554 
financial analysis, and to note that BCR does not represent the risk of the project. The expected 555 
BCR indicate the net impacts to the community and CV indicates the quantified net risks to the 556 
community. The box and whisker plots effectively represented the outcome of the analysis. For 557 
instance, the shorter boxes and whiskers indicate less risks associated and higher positioned 558 
boxes indicate higher net impacts.  559 
When a toll road project is fully delivered by the host government, the public is bearing the 560 
whole project risk. In contrast, when a toll road project is designed, built, operated and/or 561 
financed by a private operator, some risk that is borne by the host government is shifted to the 562 
private operator. When evaluating a toll road project with respect to a public good, the impacts 563 
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and their risks that are borne by the host government on behalf of its constituents should be 564 
considered in the evaluation. In this regard, the risk that is borne by the private operator can 565 
effectively be sequestered from the evaluation under the TUC perspective. Therefore, the 566 
evaluation of a privately operated toll road project can reflect this shift of the risk between the 567 
host government and the private operator under the TUC perspective. Risk profiles of TTP and 568 
TUC perspectives appropriately reflected the shift of risk in two scenarios. CV was lowered in 569 
the TUC risk profile, which indicates the shift of the risk. 570 
Due to the assumptions applied in the models used in this study, the risk profiles of three 571 
scenarios of TUC perspective did not show significant variations with respect to the risk. 572 
Applications of various assumptions in order to model toll road project specific payments 573 
would further extend the knowledge in terms of how the risk varies with each assumption. 574 
The synthesised case was found to benefit the community between 57% and 61% of trials, 575 
depending on perspectives and scenarios. The decision-maker may consider it risky to proceed 576 
due to the risk that is quantified by the CV in BCR, and the reasonably high probability of BCR 577 
being less than 1.0.  578 
The calculated baseline toll price for this synthesised case was $ 4.89. This is slightly lower 579 
than the car toll prices of existing toll roads and toll tunnels in Australia, Clem Jones Tunnel 580 
and Legacy Way, which are $ 4.93 to $ 4.94 including goods and services tax (Australian 581 
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2013). This difference can be 582 
explained by the difference between the theoretical assumptions and the higher complexities 583 
of the real toll roads.  584 
Conclusion 585 
This study examined alternative treatments of tolls and other toll road project related payments 586 
in public Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) for a privately operated toll road project when two 587 
perspectives of “toll as a financial transfer” (TTP) and “toll as an end user cost” (TUC) were 588 
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considered. The synthesised toll tunnel project case was evaluated using CBA across various 589 
scenarios. In those scenarios, various payments were considered and their treatments were 590 
explored under the two perspectives. The risk of the synthesised case was quantified by 591 
incorporating the Monte Carlo simulation approach. 592 
Many past studies evaluated toll road projects from different points of view other than 593 
public CBA. Various studies exist with regard to financial analysis and traffic forecasting 594 
studies of toll road projects. In comparison, public CBA evaluates a project with respect to 595 
transport benefits and costs. This allows to assess whether the project is beneficial to the 596 
community, instead of evaluating projects solely based on financial impacts. This study 597 
extended the knowledge of evaluation of a toll road project by considering transport impacts 598 
using CBA.  599 
Considering TTP and TUC perspectives in public CBA has not been studied, although 600 
different perspectives have been examined in financial analysis in a number of previous studies. 601 
Treatments of some project impacts in public CBA were altered by considering these 602 
perspectives in this study. This allowed to explore whether the TUC perspective is a valid 603 
approach. The outcomes of the evaluation confirmed that the shift of risk of a privately 604 
delivered project can be observed using the proposed methodology under the TUC perspective. 605 
How public CBA can be conducted by solely evaluating the project from the public perspective 606 
was examined by considering the TTP and TUC perspectives. This is a significant contribution 607 
to the academic study, which can suggest a number of future studies on incorporating different 608 
perspectives into CBA of various infrastructure types. 609 
This study found that by incorporating stochastic approach into public CBA of a toll road 610 
project, the shift of risk can be analysed empirically, which demonstrated applications of the 611 
stochastic CBA. This study also examined the effectiveness of various measures to evaluate 612 
toll road projects. Coefficient of variation (CV) was found to be an effective measure of risk 613 
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of projects with any Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR). Percentiles and cumulative probability 614 
distribution graphs can also represent the spread of the outcome stochastic BCR, while CV 615 
quantifies the level of risk in an empirical manner, which can easily be compared across 616 
scenarios. 617 
The assumptions used in this study to develop the models of the toll road project related 618 
payments can differ between projects in practice. One of the key contributions of the 619 
methodology presented in this study is that it can incorporate various strategies and approaches 620 
to model the payments. Additionally, the risks of input variables including traffic forecasts and 621 
toll price can be quantified in the methodology. These risks tend to reduce towards the opening 622 
of the toll road. As has been previously discussed, the risk that is borne by the host government 623 
varies between projects. These changes and shifts of risks can also be quantified using the 624 
methodology. The quantified risk is one of the key pieces of information that assists in 625 
decision-making for a major project. The contributions of this study are not limited to academic 626 
contributions but also to provide a useful evaluation tool that can readily be used in practice.  627 
Additionally, this study demonstrated graphical representations of the net impacts and risks 628 
of the project using cumulative probability distributions, and box and whisker plots. Visually 629 
representing the analysis outcome is particularly useful for the decision-maker. For instance, 630 
the length and the position of each box in a box and whisker plot represents the net impacts 631 
and risks of the project across various scenarios. The decision-makers can efficiently make a 632 
well-informed decision without having to have to read and interpret numerously represented 633 
outcomes when the outcomes are represented visually. 634 
 The risk of discount rate was not considered in this study. Discount rate depends on the 635 
risk shared between public and private sectors for any Public-Private and Partnership (PPP) 636 
projects. This is because the systematic risk premium is adjusted to reflect the proportion of 637 
risks that the public sector is bearing (Australian Department of Infrastructure and Regional 638 
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Development, 2013). The impact of the risk of discount rate can be explored in the future study. 639 
Detailed case studies of existing toll road projects can also be conducted to further explore the 640 
impacts of the ramp-up period, discount rates and various payment arrangements.  641 
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 826 
Tables 827 
TABLE 1 Evaluation of toll road projects found in academic literature 828 
Author Study purpose Item evaluated 
Aldrete, Bujanda and 
Valdez (2012) 
The study evaluated public revenue 
financial risk exposure when transport 
infrastructure is delivered through PPP. 
Revenue risk exposure 
Anas and Lindsey 
(2011) 
The study reviewed urban road pricing 
theory on the basis of a toll road project. 
Benefits and costs, public 
transport, public acceptance 
Bain (2009) The study reported the results from the 
study of toll road forecasting performance. 
Traffic forecasts 
Bel and Foote (2009) The study explored the implications with 
respect to the public interest. 
Impacts of toll road concessions 
on the public interest 
Carpintero (2010) The study examined the gap between the 
expected outcomes and the actual results of 
toll roads. 
Traffic forecasts, contract 
management, government’s role 
Li and Hensher 
(2010) 
The study compared and discussed actual 
traffic levels and forecasts. 
Traffic forecasts 
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Author Study purpose Item evaluated 
Liyanage and 
Villalba-Romero 
(2015) 
The study measured overall success of PPP 
toll road projects. 
Qualitative measures from 
project management, stakeholder 
and contract management 
perspectives. 
Lombard, Sinha, & 
Brown (1992) 
The study investigated the relationship 
between change in employment or wages 
and the length of major roads. 
Employment, wages, road 
conditions, and lengths and 
capital costs of major roads 
Mishra, Khasnabis 
and Swain (2013) 
The study proposed a framework to analyse 
measures of effectiveness of each entity 
involved in a toll road project. 
Capital cost, operation and 
maintenance cost, toll revenues 
and other payments to the toll 
operator 
Odeck (2008) The study evaluated the technical efficiency 
of toll companies. 
Payments to governors, 
operational costs, traffic volume, 
number of lanes, and other 
productivity measures. 
Oh, Labi and Sinha 
(2007) 
The study investigates road pricing options 
and financial viability of a toll road project. 
Road pricing, toll revenues and 
financial costs 
Vassallo, Ortega and 
de los Ángeles Baeza 
(2012) 
The study analysed the impact that the 
economic recession had on the performance 
of toll highway concessions in Spain and 
the actions that the government adopted to 
avoid the bankruptcy of the concessionaires. 
Risk allocations and traffic 
growth 
Welde (2011) The study examined demand and operating 
cost forecasting accuracy for Norwegian toll 
projects by comparing the forecasted and 
actual levels of traffic and operating costs. 
Traffic forecasts and operating 
costs 
Zhang (2008) The study developed models of market 
entry, price, and capacity choices on mixed-
ownership networks to address these 
research needs. 
Market entry, price, and capacity 
choices 
Zhang, Bai, Labi and 
Sinha (2013) 
The study investigated in the decision-
making process: economic efficiency of 
privatization and the protection of public 
interest. 
Financial transactions and public 
interest 
 829 
TABLE 2 Measures of risk profiles and their interpretations 830 
Risk profile Measures used in this study Interpretation 
Central 
tendency 
Mean, reflecting the expected 
Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) 
A higher value reflects a lower risk profile. 
Median, reflecting the middle 
BCR 
A higher median than mean reflects a lower risk 
profile. 
Spread Coefficient of variation (CV) CV is a normalised measure of spread. A higher CV 
implies a wider distribution, for a higher risk 
profile. 
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Risk profile Measures used in this study Interpretation 
Percentile 
 
The probability of a specific 
BCR 
The proportion of BCR trials greater than 1.0 
represents the probability of the project being 
beneficial. A higher probability reflects a lower risk 
profile. 
 831 
TABLE 3 Costs to the community that are considered in public CBA for this study 832 
Perspective Scenario Costs considered 
Toll as a transfer payment (TTP) Capital and O&M costs 
Toll as an end user 
cost (TUC)   
Baseline toll, no guarantee 
(BNG) 
Baseline tolls paid by end users and upfront 
capital cost contribution 
Baseline toll, minimum 
revenue guarantee (BRG) 
Guarantee payment, baseline tolls paid by end 
users and upfront capital cost contribution 
Premium toll, no guarantee 
(PNG) 
Premium tolls paid by end users and upfront 
capital cost contribution 
 833 
TABLE 4 Characteristics of Australian toll tunnels  834 
Characteristic Legacy Way Clem Jones Tunnel Airport Link 
Opening year 2015 (Transurban, 
2016b) 
2010 (Transurban, 
2015) 
2012 (Transurban, 2016a) 
Capital cost AU$ 1.5 billion 
(ACCIONA Australia, 
2015) 
AU$ 3 billion (Go 
VIA, 2015) 
AU$ 5.6 billion 
(BrisConnections, 2011) 
Annual average daily 
traffic (AADT)  
18,000 (2016 estimate) 
(Morgans Financial, 
2016) 
27,000 (2015 actual) 
(Morgans Financial, 
2016) 
30,757 (2012 actual) 
(BrisConnections, 2012) 
Proportion of heavy 
vehicles (HV%)  
Unknown  17 % (Transurban, 
2014) 
Unknown 
Vehicle kilometres 
travelled saving 
(VKTS) (Google, 
2016) 
0.7 km  1.2 km  1.0 km  
Vehicle hours 
travelled saving 
(VHTS) 
Between 3 and 18 
minutes depending on 
the time of the day 
(Google, 2016) 
Between 8 and 17 
minutes depending on 
the time of the day (Go 
VIA, 2016) 
Between 10 and 14 minutes 
depending on the time of 
the day (Google, 2016) 
Planning horizon 40 years (SKM & 
Connell Wagner, 
2008) 
Unknown 45 years (SKM & Connell 
Wagner, 2006) 
Discount rate 6.0 % (SKM & 
Connell Wagner, 
2008) 
Unknown 6.8 % (SKM & Connell 
Wagner, 2006) 
Measuring Impacts and Risks to the Public of a Privately Operated Toll Road Project by 
Considering Perspectives in Cost-Benefit Analysis 
38 
 835 
TABLE 5 Assumptions made in the public CBA calculation of the synthesised toll tunnel project 836 
case 837 
Item  Assumption and the expected value 
Capital cost Cowan’s M3 distribution with 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 = AU$ 1.4 billion and probability of 
actual cost being greater than the minimum, 𝜙 = 63 %, while maintaining an 
expected value of AU$ 1.5 billion and a CV of 10 %. 
AADT at year 1 30,000  
Yearly traffic growth in 
percentage 
2.8 %, the same rate as traffic growth rate in Queensland, Australia  
HV% 10 %  
VKTS 1.0 km  
VHTS 15 min (0.25 h) 
Type of project A toll tunnel project in the greater South East Queensland region, Australia. 
Age of facility A newly constructed facility that has never been used before opening. 
The expected economic 
life of a tunnel 
100 years (Australian Transport Council, 2006) 
Facility type Acts as part of the motorway (freeway) network in Australia and is 
connected to other major roads. 
Residual value The value of an asset is assumed to depreciate linearly over its expected 
economic life. 
Opening year Opening year is assumed to be year 1 and therefore daily traffic volume of 
the first year is equal to AADT before applying any growth. Traffic volume 
will then be increased yearly with the traffic growth rate defined. 
User benefits User benefits will be accrued from year 1. 
Capital cost and, 
operation and 
maintenance (O&M) 
cost values 
Total cost of the whole of planning horizon in present value. Capital cost was 
applied as a lump sum at year 1. O&M cost was distributed equally over the 
planning horizon. The proportions of O&M and capital cost are 10 % and 90 
% respectively over the whole planning horizon. 
Maximum AADT Absolute maximum AADT for four lane tunnel is 100,000 (based upon 2,250 
pc/h/ln according to the Highway Capacity Manual (Transportation Research 
Board, 2010) with two lanes per direction, peak hour directional split of 55 
%, peak hour to daily ratio of 12 %). 
Planning horizon 50 years 
Discount rate 7.0 % 
 838 
Table 6 Probability distribution forms and CV of the case depend input variables 839 
Variable Source 
Probability 
distribution form 
CV 
Annual average daily traffic (AADT) NA Normal distribution 10 % 
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Variable Source 
Probability 
distribution form 
CV 
Traffic  growth NA Normal distribution 10 % 
Proportion of heavy vehicles (HV%) NA Normal distribution 10 % 
Vehicle kilometres travelled saving (VKTS) NA Normal distribution 10 % 
Vehicle hours travelled saving (VHTS) Salling and Leleur (2011) Normal distribution 20 % 
 840 
TABLE 7 Impacts of the synthesised toll tunnel case when all variables were deterministically 841 
equal to their expected values in present value 842 
Project impact Amount  Proportion  
Travel time saving AU$ 1,553,975,403  83.9 % 
Vehicle operating cost (VOC) saving AU$ 209,578,588  11.3 % 
Crash cost (CC) saving AU$ 5,927,046  0.3 % 
Environmental and external cost (EEC) saving AU$ 55,623,491  3.0 % 
Residual value AU$ 27,243,077  1.5 % 
Total saving of transport costs AU$ 1,852,347,605  
Capital cost AU$ 1,500,000,000 90.9 % 
Operation and maintenance (O&M) cost AU$ 150,000,000 9.1 % 
Total cost  AU$ 1,650,000,000 
Net present value AU$ 202,347,605 
BCR 1.12 
 843 
TABLE 8 Risk profiles of the synthesised toll tunnel project case across perspectives and 844 
scenarios 845 
Perspective  Scenario 
Expected 
BCR 
Median CV 
Proportion of BCR 
trials greater than 1.0 
Toll as a transfer payment (TTP) 1.06 1.05 21% 59% 
Toll as an end user 
cost (TUC)   
Baseline toll, no 
guarantee (BNG) 
1.05  1.05 17% 61% 
Baseline toll, minimum 
revenue guarantee 
(BRG) 
1.03 1.03 18% 57% 
Premium toll, no 
guarantee (PNG) 
1.03 1.03 17% 57% 
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